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TOWARD A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR FEDERAL AND
STATE JUDGES IN MASS TORT LITIGATION
FRANCIS E. MCGOVERNt
Judges are now players in the mass tort game.' Whatever ap-
proach any judge takes in managing a mass tort, judicial input is a
critical factor in the ultimate progress of the litigation. To certify or
not to certify, for example, is a question that must be answered with
profound results for the outcome of the mass tort. Recognizing the
role of judges, recent legal literature has suggested that the ubiquity
and massness of the tort should lead to cooperation among judges.
Through cooperation, judges can promote efficiency and horizontal
equity in the adjudication.$
"Cooperation" among judges has been promoted in multiple and
often confusing forms; "cooperation" has varyingly meant communi-
cation, coordination, collaboration, or cooperation in the negotiation
t Visiting Professor, Stanford Law School; Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
Great appreciation is due to the many state and federal judges with whom I have
worked over the last 20 years. In particular, Judges AnthonyJ. Scirica and Paul V.
Niemeyer, the members of the Working Group on Mass Torts, and the various partici-
pants in its meetings have been of invaluable assistance. Thanks, also, are due to Pro-
fessor Stephen B. Burbank for organizing the symposium issue.
' SeeFrancis E. McGovern, An Analysis ofMass TortsforJdges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821,
1838-41 (1995) (discussing the changing roles ofjudges in confronting mass torts).
2 For example, in the Norplant, silicone gel breast implant, repetitive stress syn-
drome, and Fen/Phen litigations, the certification issue has been paramount. See infra
Part VI (explaining the de facto implementation of a cooperative strategy among fed-
eral and state judges in four prominent mass tort cases).
3 SeeJAMEs G. APPLE ET AL, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIR., MANUAL FOR COOPERATION
BEi"EEN STATE AND FEDERAL COuRTS 1 (1997) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR
COOPERATION] ("This manual seeks to promote cooperation between state and federal
judges and courts and to suggest many practical ways of doing so."); William W
Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal
Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1732-33 (1992) (concluding that intersystem coordination
among courts "achieved major gains in efficiency and economy"); Symposium, National
Conference on State-FederalJudidal Relationships, 78 VA. L. REV. 1655 (1992) (providing
articles and commentaries regarding the need for federal and state courts to coordi-
nate with each other).
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sense of seeking joint gains. In the national mass tort context, "coop-
eration" has more often been a euphemism for a case management
strategy of aggregating and centralizing litigation and encouraging
state trial judges to defer to a federal multidistrict transferee judge in
resolving litigation. This strategy has critical weaknesses that limit its
ultimate value. It has behavioral, structural, and political impedi-
ments; it can conflict with an appreciation of the maturity and elastic-
ity6 of mass torts, and it may run contrary to recent Supreme Court ju-
risprudence.7 There is an alternative cooperative strategy that has
significantly more potential for benefiting judges, litigants, and the
legal system as a whole. The alternative strategy can be implemented
de jure or de facto and focuses at the institutional, rather than indi-
vidual, level and suggests complimentary, rather than competing,
roles for state and federal courts.
I. THE ROLE OFTHEJUDGE IN MASS TORTS
Over the last thirty years judges have expanded their vision of
themselves from umpires to managers.8 The most prominent judges
in the first half of the twentieth century were the opinion writers;9 the
most recognized judges now are case managers. In the context of
mass torts, the role of the judge can be analogized more to a "player."
4 See Schwarzer et al., supra note 3, at 1733-40 (providing an overview of effective
coordination).
See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV.
659, 659 (1989) (defining mature mass torts); ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES &
WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS, REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION 22-25 (Feb. 15,
1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION] (describing the maturation
process and its consequences in mass torts).
6 See McGovern, sura note 1, at 1827-34 (discussing the phenomenon of elasticity
within the context of mass torts).
7 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2297 (1999) (illus-
trating the inelasticity of suits within the context of federal tort claims aggregation);
Amichem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619-29 (1997) (same).
8 SeeJudith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982) ("Many
federal judges have departed from their earlier attitudes... dropp[ing] the relatively
disinterested pose to adopt a more active, 'managerial' stance."). For one judge's own
comments on the judicial role in the modem era of mass tort litigation, see Judge Jack
Weinstein's book INDIVIDUALJUSTIcE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 89-111 (1995) and his
article Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 538-60 (1994)
[hereinafter Weinstein, EthicalDilemmas].
9 Obvious examples includejustice Holmes, see G. EDWARD WHIIE, JUsTIcE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF (1993), Justice Cardozo, see ANDREW L.
KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998), and Judge Learned Hand, see GERALD GUNTHER,
LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THEJUDGE (1994).
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Judges Carl Rubin," Jack Weinstein, 1 Robert Parker, 2 Tom Lambros
5
and others have been more critical in the process leading to the out-
come of mass torts than the lawyers or their clients. They were the
ones who, in effect, taught the bar how to resolve large numbers of
cases. Had it not been for their innovative use of single issue trials,"
class actions, alternative dispute resolution, and other pragmatic pro-
cedural techniques, the mass tort bar would not be the same today.
Because of both the potential elasticity of mass torts and the mag-
nifying effects of any outcomes on other similarly situated plaintiffs,
judicial management decisions inevitably are determinative, regardless
of the decision.4 If ajudge decides to try one case at a time, that deci-
sion has a chilling effect on the filing of new cases.'5 In this era of en-
"0 Judge Rubin presided over and coordinated litigation involving the Beverly Hills
Supper Club. See Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 44-46 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (involving a
class action suit following a fire at a restaurant). Rubin also handled the Bendectin
cases. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp.
1212, 1249 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (holding that plaintiffs were not denied a fair trial), affd
sub nom. In reBendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988).
" Judge Weinstein consolidated numerous claims against manufacturers of "Agent
Orange." See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 603 F. Supp. 239, 241 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (involving a class of Vietnam veterans and their families who were suing the U.S.
government before presidingJudge Weinstein), modfied, 818 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1987).
For a full account of the "Agent Orange" litigation andJudge Weinstein's role in it, see
PETER H. ScHucK, AGENT ORANGE ON TaIAI- MASS ToXIc DisASRs IN THE COURTS
(1987). Judge Weinstein also oversaw the asbestos victims' trust funds involving the
Johns-Manville Corporation. SeeIn rejoint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 151 F.R.D. 540,
546 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that quashing notices of deposition was appropriate in
this class action asbestos litigation).
12Judge Parker consolidated thousands of asbestos cases in Jenkins v. Raymark In-
dustries, 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985), afJ'd 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); Cimino v.
Raymark Industries, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990); and In reAsbestos Litigation,
90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119
S. Ct. 2295 (1999). See also Judgment Entered Awarding $44.5 Million in Fees, MEALES's
LrnG. REP.: ASBESTOS, Sept. 22, 1995, at 14-15 (reporting thatJudge Parker awarded
over $44.5 million in fees and $1.2 million in expenses to plaintiffs' counsel in Oftiz).
s judge Thomas Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio was in charge of the
Ohio Asbestos Litigation. See In re Ohio Asbestos Litig., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Cal-
laghan) 1169, 1169 (N.D. Ohio 1990) ("[I]nterim order issues to establish a national
class of present and future plaintiffs ... who have ... claims for asbestos-related per-
sonal injury. .. ."); see also Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Man-
aging Complex Litigation, 53 U. CmH. L. REV. 440, 478-91 (1986) (describing the Ohio
Asbestos Litigation).
14 See RE2ORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATiON, supra note 5, at 16 (noting that "[w]hile
courts generally have aggregated mass tort cases for more efficient disposition, the very
process of aggregation can generate additional cases"); McGovern, supra note 1, at
1840 (noting that "[t]here is no way for a court to avoid being a player in an elastic
mass tort").
" See George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
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trepreneurial litigation, plaintiffs' counsel are not typically eager to
inventory large numbers of cases unless they think that the cases will
be resolved in a timely fashion. In the context of ajudicial setting that
promotes timely case resolution, however, plaintiffs' attorneys will use
a larger inventory of cases to create superior bargaining power. If a
judge decides to create an inexpensive and expeditious case manage-
ment procedure via trial or settlement, the judge invites new filings.
"If you build a super-highway, there will be a traffic jam."6
Recently there has been a major shift in the mass tort litigation
area. The Supreme Court and various federal courts of appeals have
rejected many of the pragmatic case management approaches devel-
oped by the trial judges in the trenches. The high water mark of ag-
gregation or collective case processing, at least for certain purposes,
has been reached. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,17 Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp.,"' Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,'9 Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc.,20 Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,2 In re Three Mile Island
Litigation,n and other opinions suggest that certain fundamental prin-
ciples of our system of litigation have triumphed over pragmatism.23
The model of one-by-one resolution of each individual's rights, either
plaintiff's or defendant's, in the context of our system of federalism is
the predominant model. Circumventing those principles, even if it
means a more efficient overall outcome, is not acceptable.2 4
The prevailing litigation environment places more emphasis on
corrective justice values such as individual autonomy and fundamental
principles of due process, and less of a focus on efficiency.2 It also
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (discussing factors that contribute to the economic decision
to pursue litigation).
16 McGovern, supra note 1, at 1840.
17 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
"' 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
19 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
20 157 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
1 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
605 F. Supp. 778 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
23 See Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39
ARiz. L. REv. 595, 602 (1997) (noting that "[t]he current phase in this saga recognizes
the recent chilly reception of mass tort class actions in federal courts").
2'4 Compare the Fifth Circuit's comment that:
We are also uncomfortable with the suggestion that a move from one-on-one
'traditional' modes is little more than a move to modernity. Such traditional
ways of proceeding reflect far more than habit. They reflect the very culture
of the jury trial and the case and controversy requirement of Article m.
In reFibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 710-11 (5th Cir. 1990).
2 See David G. Owen, Foreword to PHILOsOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw 2
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places more emphasis on federalism than on federalization.6 In this
context, there is an opportunity for the judiciary to develop new
strategies for resolving mass torts. Rather than viewing cooperation at
thejudge-to-judge level, a more productive form of cooperation at the
state judiciary-to-federal judiciary level has the potential to accommo-
date and advance both of these sets of goals. A strategy of coopera-
tion from an institutional perspective can achieve far more joint gains
in the sense of integrative bargaining than the prevailing individual
efforts at cooperation.
This concept of cooperation is closely akin to the notion of coop-
eration in negotiation theory.27 Cooperation in this context means
seeking a mutually beneficial outcome by transforming a zero sum
game into an opportunity for achieving joint gains. By working to-
gether in exploring the true interests of the parties, sharing informa-
tion, and taking advantage of differences in those interests, it may be
possible to agree on a solution that is more satisfactory to all parties.
This cooperative strategy attempts to take advantage of both the re-
vised value set imposed on the trenches by appellate judges and the
realities of the relationships currently in practice among federal and
state judges, among the varieties of plaintiffs' counsel, and between
defense counsel and their clients.
II. UNPACING THE CONCEPT OF COOPERATION
AMONGJUDGES IN MASS TORTS
Chief Justice Burger,28 Chief Justice Rehnquist Federal Judicial
(David G. Owen ed., 1995) (noting that "Em]odern Anglo-American scholarship of tort
law and philosophy was preceded by, and to a large extent engaged in reaction to, im-
portant economic efficiency theories of tort liability").
See Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System; 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 31
(1997) (noting that "the locus of [the reform] efforts reflects a proper response to
federalism concerns about the tort system").
See Mary Jo Eyster, Clinical Teaching, Ethical Negotiation, and Moral Judgment, 75
NEB. L. REV. 752, 775 n.62 (1996) (detailing that under a cooperative view of negotia-
tion both parties are highly committed to arriving at a reasonable and fair result and
both assume that each side can succeed) (citing GERALD WILLIAMS, LEGAL
NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 53 (1983)); Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting to YES,
in APPROACHES TO PEACE 70, 70-75 (David P. Barash ed., 2000) (describing the bene-
fits of cooperation in negotiation).
2' See William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Conference on State-Federal
judicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1659 (1992) (noting that ChiefJustice Bur-
ger encouraged the formation of the National Council for State and Federal Courts,
which fosters strategies for cooperation amongjudges).
29 See id. at 1657 ("[N]o time is more important than now to focus on better rela-
tionships among the federal and state courts.").
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Center Directors Schwarzer and Zobel,'0 Professor Dan Meador, s' the
State Justice Institute ("SJI"),) 2 and others have promoted cooperation
among judges in order to assist in the fair, timely, and efficient resolu-
tion of litigation. These thoughtful proposals have generally focused
on communication and coordination. Their goals have been twofold:
eliminating redundancy and promoting consistency. Any cooperation
beyond communication and coordination has, in practice, been trans-
lated into a zero-sum game: state judges defer to federal transferee
judges, and federal transferee judges make the decisions. The imbal-
ance in judicial resources and the scope of jurisdiction are simply too
great to develop reciprocal cooperative efforts. Anyjoint gains, there-
fore, stem only from the reduction of duplicative efforts and the in-
crease in consistency amongst outcomes, but do not extend further.
Other approaches to "cooperation" suggest collaboration not only
in joint scheduling and division of labor, but also in the sense ofjoint
decision making. There has also been the prospect of "cooperation"
in the sense of integrative bargaining, i.e., state and federal judges
"negotiating" to achieve more preferable outcomes for managing
mass tort litigation.
In reality, communication and coordination, particularly in the
early stages of a case's life cycle, are often quite successful. There
have been major strides in overcoming the behavioral impediments
inherent in judicial cooperation, and there have been significant
benefits to both judges and litigants in achieving efficiency goals by
joint scheduling and division of labor. Collaborative decision making
has been less common. True integrative bargaining has proven gen-
erally unachievable.
In addition to this general plea for cooperation among judges in
mass torts, there has been a second theme: "cooperation" as a means
of achieving centralization of control over the litigation in a federal
court. Various judges and academics have developed a procedure for
" See MANUAL FOR COOPERATION, supra note 3, at 1 ("This manual seeks to pro-
mote cooperation between state and federal judges and courts and to suggest many
practical ways of doing so."); Schwarzer et al., supra note 8, at 1-2 ("This Article tells the
stories of how several state and federal judges forged into uncharted territory to coor-
dinate complex litigation pending in their courts.").
3' See Daniel J. Meador, Concluding Remarks: National Conference on State-Federal judi-
cial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REv. 1895, 1895 (1992) (describing the need for more co-
operation among federal and statejudges).
-2 See Editorial Note 78 VA. L. REV. 1655, 1655 (1992) (introducing the 1992 Na-
tional Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships and noting that it was spon-
sored by the StateJustice Institute).
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resolving mass torts that focuses on consolidation and aggregation,
thereby enhancing the chances for a global resolution. The aim is to
resolve an entire mass tort with finality by centralizing control in one
locus. It becomes critical to have individual judges "cooperate" so that
the litigants do not have competing forums in which to operate. State
judges, in particular, could create venues that would thwart this cen-
tralization strategy if they did not defer to the federal judge.
The separate themes of (1) communication and coordination and
(2) centralized litigation are easily confused when they are both de-
scribed as "cooperation." The former has achieved substantial success
with only limited downside; the latter is subject to major problems.
There are substantial risks of error costs by over-centralization. If,
for example, discovery is limited to a single opportunity, the chances
of fully sharing information are reduced. The history of the Dalkon
Shield litigation illustrates the limitations inherent in one-shot discov-
ery.
Unless there is complete centralization, there may be disparate
verdicts creating difficulties for assembling consistent data points to
inform an accurate settlement 3 Typically state judges who do not de-
fer tend to be in non-representative jurisdictions. As a result, trial
outcomes, and even settlement values, can skew any comprehensive
analysis.
There is also the risk of error from the consolidation itself. The
stakes of litigation can often rise to such a level that defendants are
forced to settle or risk losing their entire assets. Alternatively, control
of the consolidation may end up in the hands of attorneys more intent
on resolution than accuracy. Whenever plaintiffs' counsel are able to
raise the ante in a single trial or otherwise engage in a "piling on"
strategy, the impetus for settlement tends to dwarf issues of scientific
merit. Most risk-averse defendants will choose to settle for higher
amounts than may otherwise be warranted. At the same time the capi-
tal markets are not usually enamored of ever-changing litigation risk.
These investors may, then, overvalue finality. Recent legal literature4
"The concept of data points contemplates all aspects of a litigated tort outcome-
the substantive law as well as any jury award. The process ofjudicial decision making
can involve multiple data points as tort law evolves. See McGovern, supra note 5, for
discussion of "maturity."
34See REPORT ON MASS TORT LTIGATION, supra note 5, at 38-39 (offering compet-
ing arguments about the quality of representation as it impacts the overall utility of
class action suits in the mass tort context);John C. Coffee,Jr., Class Wars: TheDilemma
of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1346 (1995) ("[T]his article rec-
ognizes that individual plaintiffs have weak to nonexistent control over their attorneys
1873
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and casess' have also explored the pitfalls of agency failure in the set-
tlement of mass tort litigation.
State judicial deferral to federal courts also has potential negative
implications for our system of federalism. Our concept of federalism
connotes independence on the part of the states to make legal deci-
sions that are final, at least on certain governmental issues. This idea
of independent, autonomous authority in state courts is limited by de
facto federal decision making, particularly when the ultimate author-
ity on substantive tort common law is held by the states. There is little
opportunity for truly cooperative decision making: federal courts
make Eien-educated guesses to retain or to certify issues to state su-
preme courts. With a few limited exceptions,3 7 efforts to develop a
predominant federal common law, or federal consensus law, to trump
state law in mass torts has not been successful. There are substantial
differences between federal and state evidence and procedure, par-
ticularly in regard to experts, that create quite different playing fields.
Even the issue of choice of law has been enormously controversial
when the aim is to apply a uniform substantive law to a given mass
tort. The current trend in Supreme Court decision making is cer-
tainly not toward additional federal authority in this regard.
The judicial rules of ethics, the adversarial process, and the cus-
toms of litigation all allow judges to communicate and coordinate
amongst themselves but do not contemplate collective decisions by
independently elected or selected trial level judges. Appellate judges
collaborate in this manner, but trial judges do not view their role as
seeking out other trial judges for ex ante consensus building. The
trial process seeks mightily to convert complex disputes into discrete,
zero-sum games so that the judge or jury can provide unequivocal re-
sponses to each dispute. Decision making in this context is explicitly
either/or. Rules of procedure are specifically designed for this pur-
pose.
There is a final downside risk associated with the attempts at ad
hoc cooperation: unpredictability. The contours of a contextual and
across the mass tort context for reasons that are inherent to the economics of mass tort
litigation.").
3' See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (determining a standard for
choice-of-law issues in federal diversity actions).
s 7 See Steven R. Swanson, Federalism, the Admiralty, and Oil Spills, 27J. MAP. L. &
COM. 379, 380 (1996) (noting that admiralty law aims to create efficient and fair tort
rules).
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personality driven effort at cooperation typically vary from case to
case, and an inevitable lack of predictability can create inefficient op-
portunities for tactical, strategic, and satellite gaming by lawyers.
These opportunities can unnecessarily prolong and complicate the
litigation by inducing counterproductive opportunities for pretrial
maneuvering. If, for example, one set of counsel believes that it can
achieve more favorable results in a given forum or before a given
judge, there will inevitably be skirmishes to test the limits of judicial
cooperation as an independent issue.
III. THE EFFORTFOR TOP-DowN REFORM
Lacking a unified method to resolve competing judicial authority
in mass tort litigation, there have been multiple efforts to-impose a
mandatory, unified, rational, and coherent approach on state and
federal courts. These efforts have focused upon the problems of ex-
cessive transaction costs, delayed access to courts, lack of horizontal
equity in outcomes, and the overall challenges to the legitimacy of the
judicial process in the resolution of mass torts.
Most of the recent approaches for unified case management
originated in the electrical equipment conspiracies' that confronted
the federal judiciary in the 1960s. Facing multiple cases with similar
allegations, federal judges cooperated as much as was feasible. Not-
withstanding this cooperation, these judges concluded that a statutory
mechanism was necessary to aggregate cases and to provide consistent
case management guidelines for their resolution. The result was the
creation of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation" 9 and the
Manual for Complex Litigation.40 The Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL")
approach allows a panel of judges appointed by the Chief Justice to
aggregate all similarly situated federal cases into one transferee court
for pretrial discovery.41 The original Manual provided for rule-like
"waves" of discovery that would instruct a standardized management
"See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59, 60 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (adjudicating a "large number of private actions that followed the criminal and
civil injunctive proceeding brought by the United States Government against electrical
equipment manufacturers in 1960 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania"); CHARLES
A. BANE, Tim ELECTRIcAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES (1973).
3' See 28 U.S.C § 1407(a) (1994) (consolidating actions with similar questions of
fact).
'0 FEDERALJUDICIAL CGr., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTI-DWsRICT LITIGATION
(West 1969) [hereinafterMANUALFOR COMPLEX LITIGATION lST].
41 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), (b).
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process. Recently, federal judges have viewed the MDL process more
expansively, not restricting their authority to transfer solely for pre-
trial purposes but to aggregate cases in order to pursue overall settle-
ment or initiate a conclusive trial.4
The Supreme Court ruled in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach that the transferee judge does not have the authority
to try transferred cases.4 There is newly proposed legislation to
amend § 1407 to allow for trial consolidation." The Manual has been
revised to eliminate the standardized rule-like approach and to substi-
tute a menu of case management techniques that can be tailored to
46
each case. The current wisdom among judges is that there is no one
proper model for resolving a mass tort. Instead, each case must be
viewed as unique. Although the MDL approach has been enormously
successful within its limitations, its use to rationalize mass tort resolu-
tion has been restricted by its application to federal-only cases, its lack
of authority to try all transferred cases, the complexities of Erie-related
educated guesses on substantive law, its inherent procedural unpre-
dictability, and, as will be seen, the self-selection of cases filed in fed-
eral court.
47
The American Law Institute, recognizing the need for alternative
solutions to the balkanization of mass tort resolution, initiated two
projects that embody exquisite rationality.45 The Complex Litigation
Project has created the most comprehensive proposal for simplifying
4 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 1sT, supra note 40, § 21.422 (describing
phased, sequenced, and targeted discovery).
See REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 52-53 (discussing the
recommendation "that § 1407 be amended to establishjudicial authority to transfer for
trial as well as for pretrial proceedings" and other possible amendments to § 1407).
44 523 U.S. 26, 28 (1998) (holding that a district court does not have the authority
to assign a transferred case to itself for trial, so that cases not disposed of during the
MDL process must be remanded before the conclusion of the pretrial process).
See H.R. 2112, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999); AMERICAN LAW INST., COMPLEX
LITIGATION PROJECT 31 (Proposed Final Draft 1993) [hereinafter COMPLEX
LrIIGATION PROJECT] (noting various legislative proposals to amend § 1407).
16 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (2d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2D]; FEDERALJUDICIAL CTRiL, MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION 3D].
17 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties related to
developing a predominant federal law approach to mass torts).
'a See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 45, at 1-7 (describing the motiva-
tions for, and the general outline of the Complex Litigation Project); 2 AMERICAN LAW
INsT., REPORTER'S STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (1991)
[hereinafter PERSONAL INJURY PROJECT] (summarizing the ALI's various proposals for
reform of the tort system).
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approaches to complex litigation.? Thoughtfully constructed with a
reconciliation of practical, theoretical, and doctrinal concerns,0 it is
the most respected model available. It has not, however, been imple-
mented.5' Nor has the ALI Enterprise Responsibility for Personal In-
jury Project, another intellectually coherent approach to our tort pro-
cess, been utilized in practice. 2 Both of these top-down efforts have
been overcome by political and strategic realities.53
The American Bar Association's Mass Tort Commissions4 has met
a similar fate. Although less comprehensive and ambitious than the
ALl Complex Litigation Project, the Commission's proposal for a uni-
fied methodology to resolve mass torts nevertheless did not pass the
ABA House of Delegates.
55
Proposed federal legislation-most recently H.R. 1875, the Inter-
state Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 19995t-has met a similar fate,
with one notable exception. This exception, the federalization of Y2K
lawsuits, 7 may partially provide at least one rationale for the inability
of these reform measures to pass political muster: there were few en-
trenched and vested interests at risk because of the prospective nature
of the Y2K litigation. That has not been the case with mass tort per-
49 See ComLEX LInGATION PROJECT, supra note 45, at 1 (stating the Project's aim
to develop ways to "alleviat[e the complex litigation problem").
" See id. at 7 (citing three specific "overriding concerns" considered in the Proj-
ect's proposals).
"See id. at xxxi (noting that the material is only "a proposed Final Draft").
"See PERSONAL INJuRYPROjECr, supra note 48, at 580 (suggesting that the Project
occupies a status "midway between abstract scholarly theorizing and precise doctrinal
or legislative foundation").
" For a discussion of why the Complex Litigation Project and its inherent flaws are
impracticable and unenactable, see Linda S. Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony: The Com-
plex Litigation Project Rests, 54 LA. L. REV. 977, 979 (1994) (arguing that the Complex
Litigation Project "failed to address the myriad problems that collectively characterize
complex mass tort cases"). A similar argument regarding the Personal Injury Project's
impracticability can be found in FrankJ. Vandall, The American Law Institute Is Dead in
the Water, 26 HomrRAL. REv. 801, 811 (1998) ("The reason for the failure of the [Per-
sonal Injury Project] is that it represented almost pure economic theory and was felt to
have very little to do with products liability case law.").
54 See AIERICAN BAR ASs'N, COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE
OFDELEGATES (1989).
55 See Francis E. McGovern, Judicial Centralization and Devolution in Mass Torts, 95
MICH. L. REv. 2077, 2080-81 (1997) (discussing the lack of support for both the ALI
and ABA proposals as well as academic reaction to other similar arguments for con-
solidation).
56 H.R. RP. No. 106-320 (1999).
5 See generally Andrew S. Crouch, Comment, When the Millenium Bug Bites: Business
Liability in the Wake of the Y2KProblem, 22 HAMINE L. REV. 797, 844 (1999) (discussing
the federalization of Y2K lawsuits via the "Year 2000 Fairness and ResponsibilityAct").
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sonal injuries.
Another damper on the prospects for rationalization of mass tort
resolution by federal legislation can be viewed by analogy to the area
of securities litigation. Notwithstanding the passage of significant se-
curities litigation reform, substantial literature suggests that the de-
sired outcomes have not been achieved.5 Innovative strategies by the
ever-creative plaintiffs' bar have at least partially circumvented the
statutory restrictions.5 This lack of consolidation of mass torts by stat-
ute is history, and the future may hold more opportunities for federal
legislation. Given the recent financial success of the mass tort litiga-
tion plaintiffs' barW and their willingness to support political allies, the
conditions for reform do not currently seem auspicious.
IV. THE EFFORT FOR BOTTOM-UP REFORM
Contemporaneously with the top-down efforts at mandating a
more unified approach to resolving mass tort litigation, there have
been multiple endeavors to foster federal-state cooperation voluntarily
without the need for authoritative structures. The Federal Judicial
Center ("FJC"), the National Center for State Courts ("NCSC"), the
State Justice Institute, the Judicial Conference of the United States,
the Conference of Chief'Justices, and the National Judicial Council of
State and Federal Courts have been quite active in this regard. There
is a Manual for Cooperation Between Federal and State Courts6 published by
the FJC, NCSC and SJI. There is the "State-Federal Judicial Observer"
which was published by the FJC and the NCSC.62 There is the Mass
'See Herbert S. Wander, Developments in Securities Law Disclosure, in ADVANCED
SECURITIES WORKSHOP 1998, at 209, 266-70 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Hand-
book Series No. B0-004Y, 1998).
59 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on
Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (state-
ment of Brian Dovey, President of National Venture Capital Associates), available in
1997 WL 414096, at *6-7 (asserting that the proposed legislation would effectively stop
the problem of litigation brought in state courts in order to evade application of fed-
eral law to the suit).
w One obvious example, of course, is the fee award earned by the attorneys repre-
senting the plaintiffs against Big Tobacco in the state settlements. See Ann Davis, Cash-
ing In on a Tobacco Bonanza, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1998, at B1 (calling the award "the
biggest legal tab in U.S. history"); see also Matthew Scully, WiU Lauyers' Greed Sink the
Tobacco Settlement?, WALL ST.J., Feb. 10, 1998, at A18 (stating that the novel settlement
plan took much ingenuity on the part of the lawyers, but calling attention to the prob-
lems caused by the size of the award and the future cap on damages).
61 MANUAL FOR COOPERATION, supra note 3.
62 The ST.-FED.JUD. OBSERVER (Fed.Judicial Ctr.) was regularly published.
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Tort Litigation Committee of the Conference of ChiefJustices and the
Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee of the Judicial Conference.63
There are innumerable federal-state judicial committees in the various
states and circuits. And there was the National Conference on State-
Federal Judicial Relationships and the National Mass Torts Confer-
ence? published, respectively, in the Virginia Law Review6 and Texas
Law Review.
67
There are, however, major problems with the momentum of these
efforts. The "State-Federal Judicial Observer" is no longer being pub-
lished. The Mass Tort Litigation Committee is no longer in existence.
The SJI has had its funding drastically curtailed. Reports from the
various federal-state committees suggest that their levels of activity,
with a few exceptions, have been on the wane.6s There have been no
new appointments of special masters to assist in federal-state coopera-
tion in mass tort litigation. A survey of the legal literature does not
reveal much intellectual activity in this area, although most mass tort
S See MANUAL FOR COOPERATION, supra note 3, at 31 (discussing the functions of
the Mass Tort Litigation Committee); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 16-17 (1999) (discussing the Committee on Fed-
eral-State Jurisdiction's recommendation regarding "federal court jurisdiction over
Y2K class actions").
6 For a discussion of the aims of the conference, see Rehnquist, supra note 28, at
1657 (stating that the conference will focus on improving relations between federal
and state judiciaries).
For a similar discussion about this conference, see William H. Rehnquist, Welom-
ing Remarks: National Mass Tort Conference, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1523, 1524 (1995) (express-
ing his hope that "this conference... can graduate from generalized observations
about the desirability of [federal-state] coordination to rather specific and concrete
proposals... which will accomplish this result").
See Symposium, National Conference on State-Federaljudidal Relationships, 78 VA. L.
REv. 1657 (1992).
67 SeeSymposium, NationalMass Tort Conference, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1523 (1995).
63 The SI has faced numerous difficulties in securing funding over the years. See
John K Hudzik, Financing and Managing the Finances of the California Court System: Alter-
native Futures, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1813, 1879 (1993) (describing how the SJI "recently
survived a scare to cut its funding by upwards of 40%"); Malcolm M. Lucas, Don't Pull
the Rug Out from Under the State Justice Institute, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995, at 21 (not-
ing the irony that the House Appropriations Committee took steps to kill the StateJus-
tice Institute, "one of [ChiefJustice Burger's] most important legacies," on the day of
the late Chief'Justice's funeral).
See, eg., Letter from Paula L. Hannaford, Senior Research Associate, National
Center for State Courts, to Francis McGovern, Professor, Duke University College of
Law (Apr. 21, 2000) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (noting the
decline in the activity of state-federaljudicial councils).
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conferences for practitioners include a panel on federal-state coopera-
tion.70
At the level of individual cases, there are few signs that voluntary
cooperation is on the ascent. Although federal and state judges often
talk the talk, in many cases they do not walk the walk. In most of the
mass tort litigation, for example, the mantra of cooperation is ubiqui-
tous. 71 The federal and state judges communicate regularly, espouse
"cooperation," and then pursue independent strategies.7 The federal
asbestos cases, for example, have been aggregated before one judge,
and the court controls the docket by setting for trial only those cases
that involve severe injuries without considering punitive damages? As
a result of the lack of trial settings, plaintiffs' counsel have filed very
few new asbestos cases in federal court and have concentrated their
efforts in the state courts.74 The federal and state systems operate in-
dependently.
In the state courts, the judges run their own asbestos fiefdoms and
pursue a variety of case management approaches.7 They set cases for
trial individually or in small groups, sometimes conducting full trials
and at other times utilizing reverse bifurcation or other abbreviated
formats. Generally, the era of mass aggregation has passed, in large
70 One such seminar is Mealey's Judicial Management Seminar, Palm Beach, Fla.
71 See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort
Litigation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1851, 1858-64 (discussing efforts atjudicial cooperation in
asbestos litigation).
7 For example, Judge Holland made public statements regarding his cooperation
with state judges in the Exxon-Valdez litigation. See Hon. H. Russel Holland, The
Exxon-Valdez: Was There a Second Disaster?, Presentation at the National Mass Torts
Conference, Cincinnati, Ohio 1, 8-12 (Nov. 10, 1994) (detailing the state and federal
judicial efforts to coordinate discovery and case preparation), cited in Judith Resnik,
Afterword: Federalism's Options, 14YALEJ. ON REG. 465, 482 n.83 (1996). Judge Holland
later pursued his own agenda with respect to that case.
As a result of the MDL panel's decision to transfer asbestos cases to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, Judge Wiener assumed responsibility for almost 30,000 asbes-
tos cases. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 416, 422
(J.P.M.L. 1991) (explaining that the MDL Panel ordered 26,639 pending asbestos cases
to be transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
74 See Laura A. Foggan, Current and Future Trends in Insurance Coverage Litigation:
Emerging Mass Tort and Latent Exposure Claims, in INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION
1999, at 9, 13 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 598, 1999)
(stating that "the number of asbestos cases filed in recent years in federal
courts.., has declined").
The state court judges have, however, engaged in efforts to coordinate their as-
bestos case management efforts. See McGovern, supra note 71, at 1863 ("Contempora-
neous with the federal judicial efforts to achieve some level of cooperation among
courts, various state judges were urgingjoint efforts.").
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part because of recognition of the elasticity of the asbestos cases.
There is now a rough equilibrium between case filings and case reso-
lutions.76 Plaintiffs' counsel have in the main recognized that judges
do not view mass filings favorably. There are major individual excep-
tions,77 however, and overall case filings have increased but with a
wider geographical distribution so that the impact on any given court
has decreased.78
In the silicone gel breast implant litigation,.7 the federal transferee
judge achieved the zenith of cooperation by appointing a special mas-
ter 8 to act as a catalyst for cooperation. The court encouraged group
meetings of all interested judges, conducted hearings jointly with
other judges, and deferred on occasion to the discovery or rulings of
state judges. Virtually every effort was made at litigation to overcome
barriers to negotiation. There was an attempt to address the problems
of communication failure, counterproductive negotiation skills, lack
of information, emotionalism, and good faith disagreements. Major
energy was devoted to accommodating the typical behavioral impedi-
ments to negotiation, such as fixed pie bias, positional bargaining,
framing error, anchoring and adjusting, and overconfidence bias.0 '
The right people were at the right place at the right time and in the
right way.
In reality, "cooperation" had only two speeds-defer or don't de-
fer. On most occasions in the silicone gel breast implant litigation,
usually the state judges deferred to the federal judge, particularly dur-
76 See Foggan, supra note 74, at 13 ("Although fewer asbestos cases have been filed,
asbestos cases continue to clog court dockets because many cases are still unresolved.
Policyholder counsel have estimated that for each asbestos claim that has been re-
solved, another one is still pending.").
See Stephen Labaton, Top Asbestos Makers Agree to Settle 2 Large Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, at A22 (discussing the largest per-victim settlement in an asbestos
suit which involved plaintiffs from at least five states).
78 See Foggan, supra note 74, at 13; see, e.g., OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLASS CORP.,
1993 ANNUAL REPORT 54 (1994) ("Contingent Liabilities"); OWENS-CORNING
FmERGLASS CORP., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 65 (1995) (same); OWENS-CORMNG
FIBERGLASS CORP., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 66 (1996) (same); OWENS-CORNING
FIBERGLASS CORP., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 66 (1997) (same); OWENS-CORNING
FIBERGLASS CORP., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 67 (1998) (same).
" SeeIn re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D.
Ala. 1995).
go That special master was the author of this Article.
8' See Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Prindples in Negotiating Civil Settle-
ments, 4 HARv. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 1, 30-56 (1999) (analyzing psychological princi-
ples relevant to legal negotiation).
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ing discovery,ss but also in setting trial dates and in the timing of dis-
positive rulings. There were a few exceptions, however, that eventu-
ally became critical to the outcome of the litigation.
The tide has turned against the bottom-up front. Absent renewed
efforts, there is no general sense of optimism that a grassroots volun-
tarism will provide greater cohesiveness to our process for resolving
mass tort litigation.
V. THE OUTLINE OF AN INSTITUTIONAL
COOPERATIVE STRATEGY
If we look at the mass tort phenomenon through a slightly differ-
ent set of lenses, however, there may be an alternative approach avail-
able to accommodate the requirements of case-by-case resolution of
mass tort litigation in a federal system while pursuing a coherent case
management plan. The key to this approach is distinguishing be-
tween micro and macro decision making.!s
If we view case-by-case resolution as a series of local decisions,
there are global strategies for courts that can lead to a more coherent
resolution of mass tort litigation. One such strategy would treat each
case resolved by traditional litigation as a data point, while treating the
overall litigation process as an information system. Eventually, an
adequate number of cases will be resolved, providing sufficient infor-
mation to make informed decisions regarding the litigation as a
whole; the mass tort will become mature. At this point, it might be
possible to achieve a global outcome. This strategy would accept the
82 Except where, for example, there were differences in discussing rules and the
federaljudge deferred to a statejudge.
This approach borrows from the cognitive science paradigm of "local" and
"global" decisions. "Local" decisions involve a discrete decision node that refers to a
specific juncture of place and time; "global" decisions focus on the consequences of
each individual local decision, as well as on the connections among those local deci-
sions and the end game, or overall d6nouement. Each local decision affects ultimate
paths or processes as well as their sequencing or patterning. For example, local deci-
sions impact the degrees of freedom of global decision making. In a sense, local deci-
sions are tactical and short term, while global decisions are strategic and long term.
Another way of analyzing this revised question is to use methods designed to
achieve the desired outcome through analogy, including game theory, decision theory,
optimal route analysis, path analysis, dynamic programming, reverse induction and
others. Each of these analytic methodologies is designed to assist a decision-maker in
determining the most appropriate "strategy" to employ. A cooperative strategy could
exist harmoniously with disparate individual judicial activities in mass tort litigation.
The cooperation would be at the macro or strategic level, not at the tactical or micro
level.
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inefficiencies and inequities of case-by-case resolution as an informa-
tion cost, necessary to an informed, overall resolution. In effect, the
mass tort would be allowed to mature sufficiently so that the parties
could more effectively pursue an end game, either through bargain-
ing, trial, or otherwise. To phrase the same thought more bluntly, try
cases individually and in a systematic manner to set value, and then
resolve globally.8
The institutional cooperative strategy is thus a hybrid approach,
attempting to accentuate the strengths of the case-by-case model of
litigation and federalism, while minimizing the model's inefficiencies
and inequities. At the same time, this cooperative strategy recognizes
the interests of the plaintiffs' bar and of defendants in the world of
mass torts by providing appropriate roles for everyone.
At least four sets of diverse interests exist within the plaintiffs'
bar."' First are the boutique, or "horse and buggy," lawyers who prefer
the traditional model of case-by-case adjudication. These lawyers tend
to screen their clients carefully, prepare their cases individually, set
each one for trial, and seek premium individual compensation. Their
fees in each individual case are contingent on their success.
Class action lawyers compose the second interest group. Their
expertise arises from their ability to resolve large numbers of cases in a
collective fashion. They typically have few individual clients but repre-
sent an entire class certified by ajudge. Their fees are established by
the class action court.
A third group of plaintiffs' lawyers deal at the wholesale level.
They have large numbers of individual clients and either refer them to
the boutique lawyers or free-ride on the class action settlements.
Their fees are contingent upon the success of these other two groups
of lawyers.
Finally, there is a small group of law firms capable of pursuing any
strategy-boutique, class action, or wholesale-depending upon the
opportunities presented by each mass tort.
The conflicts that arise among these lawyers are critical factors
that both contribute to the uniqueness of mass torts and make indi-
vidual mass torts so difficult to manage. The boutique lawyers view
class action lawyers as their mortal enemies: the boutique lawyers in-
' See McGovern, supra note 5, at 690 (proposing "a hybrid process that would re-
duce transaction costs without sacrificing the individualized treatment and intangible
values associated with existing civil procedure").
8 For a supplemental discussion of the four types of plaintiffs' lawyers, see McGov-
ern, supra note 1, at 1828.
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vest in a tort, become successful in a few cases, and then, rather than
continuing to receive the benefits of their initial success by settling
one case after another, watch the class action lawyers sweep the uni-
verse of clients into a single class action settlement. The boutique
lawyers believe that class action lawyers deprive them of their justly
earned rewards and, even worse, that class action lawyers are not
"real" trial lawyers. They often contend that class action attorneys just
free-ride on previously conducted discovery, spend needless hours of
new discovery to pad bills, and resolve cases for plaintiffs who would
never have brought a "real" case anyway.
Needless to say, the class action lawyers do not agree with this
characterization. They view themselves as presenting an efficient pro-
cedural mechanism for resolving large numbers of cases, particularly
for plaintiffs who could not otherwise have benefited from the overly
expensive case-by-case litigation process. As might be expected, there
also is pervasive conflict among plaintiffs' counsel over compensation,
a conflict that can explain some of the lack of cooperation among
courts.
This intense warfare among plaintiffs' counsel typically dismays
defendants.16 This dismay is compounded because defendants are se-
lective in their evaluation of aggregative or collective treatment of
cases. Defendants typically love consolidation for discovery purposes
because of the savings in transaction costs, the reduction in repetitive
discovery, and the natural advantages of limiting discovery to one
round. On the other hand, defendants despise aggregation for trial
purposes because it lowers the transaction costs for plaintiffs' counsel
and generally attracts cases that otherwise would never have entered
the tort system. This latter characteristic of mass tort cases may be one
of the major differences between mass financial and mass personal in-
jury cases. If one plaintiff sues in a financial case, there can be fairly
high predictability as to the universe of plaintiffs. With personal in-
jury plaintiffs, however, there is little collective knowledge of their
identities. Further, their propensity to sue is quite low unless there is
some major media event, i.e., administrative recall, attorney advertis-
ing, bankruptcy or class action. These factors combine to form the
critical characteristic of elasticity in mass personal injury torts.
Once they are enmeshed in a mass tort, however, defendants typi-
cally love class actions because Rule 23 provides virtually the only
For a supplemental discussion of defendants' responses to mass tort claims filed
against them, see id. at 1834-36 (highlighting both "traditional" and "modern" mass
tort defense strategies).
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87method to obtain global peace. Bankruptcy can certainly resolve a
mass tort,8s but this process is generally not acceptable to most corpo-
rations. Daubert v. MerrellDow9 and Rule 706e experts have the poten-
tial for achieving a final resolution based upon the lack of scientific
evidence, but defendants have not usually been successful with this
approach.91
The defendants' attitudes toward aggregation are in large partjus-
tified. Class action plaintiffs' counsel, in particular, love to raise the
stakes in any litigation to a "bet your company" level. The net effect of
the class action is to make trial unpalatable to either side because the
risks are simply too great. The defendant thus never has a real oppor-
tunity to prove it has no liability if there is aggregation. Yet, usually,
the only potential for bringing global peace to the litigation is
through a class action settlement. In recent years, however, the value
of class action "peace" has been undercut by the Supreme Court.92
If there is no aggregation and plaintiffs' lawyers file cases in a
geographically dispersed manner, a defendant may still be precluded
from proving a no liability case. The transaction costs associated with
such widespread litigation may simply be too expensive to bear. In-
stead of the typical scenario where a defendant imposes large transac-
8 See REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 18 (noting that defen-
dants who wish to obtain global peace encourage additional filings and seek maximum
consolidation).
83 As one commentator has noted, "a limited fund class action settlement is in
some sense a 'designer bankruptcy.'" S. Elizabeth Gibson, MASS TORTS LMITED FUND
& BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION SETTLEMENTS: FOUR CASE STUDIES, in REPORT ON
MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 5, at app. E, at v. There have been several such
"bankruptcies" to resolve mass tort disputes, including three studied in-depth in one
Federal Judicial Center study from last year. See id. (describing four mass tort resolu-
tions, three limited fund class action settlements, and one bankruptcy reorganization).
89 509 U.S. 579, 592-97 (1993) (discussing the standards for the admissibility of ex-
pert scientific testimony).
gFE. R. EVID. 706 (detailing the requirements and duties of court-appointed ex-
perts).
9' See, e.g., 6th Circuit Finds Error in Use of 'Physical Facts' Rule To Support Dismissal,
MEALE'S DAUBERT REP., Feb. 2000, at 7 (discussing decision by court of appeals revers-
ing summary judgment for General Motors because its experts did not uncontroverti-
bly disprove plaintiff's testimony (construing Harris v. General Motors Corp., 201 F.3d
800 (6th Cir. 2000))).
For the prerequisites for limited fund settlement classes, see Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2323 (1999) (stating that, at minimum, it would
"be essential that the fund be shown to be limited independently of the agreement of
the parties to the action, and equally essential.., that the class include all those with
claims unsatisfied at the time of the settlement negotiations, with intraclass conflicts
addressed by recognizing independently represented subclasses.").
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tion costs on a plaintiff to force a settlement, multiple plaintiffs' coun-
sel may impose large collective transaction or logistical costs on a de-
fendant to compel settlement. 93
Given this landscape, there needs to be a federal and state case
management strategy that can accommodate case-by-case resolution,
federalism, efficiency, equity, and the interests of plaintiffs and defen-
dants as well as their counsel. This alternative strategy could build
upon generally accepted models for resolving local mass torts, such as
the use of test plaintiffs for discovery and trial, with settlement discus-
sions based upon the results of the test cases. 4 The first step in such a
strategy would be to determine if a tort has any viability at all by con-
ducting case-by-case discovery and trials for a subset of the mass tort
plaintiffs. If plaintiffs' counsel knew that there were a strong potential
for filed cases to be subject to extensive discovery, there would be
fewer initial filings. If there were no viability to the cases filed, the
natural economic incentives for plaintiffs' counsel would deter future
filings. If there were viability, a second step in the strategy would in-
volve trying or settling sufficient numbers of cases to establish values.
Finally, once the litigation became more mature, there could be suffi-
cient information to promote settlement or other end games such as
bankruptcy or continued trials.
VI. DE FACTO IMPLEMENTATION OF A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY
AMONG FEDERAL AND STATEJUDGES
Lest there be fear that this proposal is out in the academic ether,
note that a quite similar de facto strategy for the judicial management
of mass torts has been occurring in the real world. The Norplant,95
California silicone gel breast implant,9 6 and repetitive stress syndrome
cases97 illustrate the value of determining the vitality of the liability is-
sues prior to ultimate aggregation. The Fen/Phen litigation illustrates
'a See REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 5, at 16 ("Mass torts alter
th[e] dynamic.... [D]efendants, faced with company-threatening liability, may elect
to settle cases earlier and faster and to pay a higher value than they would under the
ordinary tort process. .. ").
'4 SeeJoseph C. Kearfott et al., Toxic Tort Litigation at the Millenium, 67 AU-ABA 35,
46-47 (1999) (discussing generally the use of test plaintiffs).
95 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 577 (E.D. Tex.
1996).
See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D.
Ala. 1995).
See In re Repetitive Stress Injury Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL-955, 1992 WL
403023 (J.P.M.L. Nov. 27, 1992).
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how parallel federal and state proceedings can complement each
other."'
The MDLjudge in Norplant decided to defer class certification is-
sues until after the court had tried several cases one-by-one. After a
series of plaintiffs went through the traditional trial process, the par-
ties had an opportunity to negotiate a global resolution based upon
the outcomes of the resolved cases.
This same type of process was used in the consolidated California
silicone gel breast implant cases. All the California-filed cases were
brought together in a state MDL for pretrial. °'° Roughly 100 cases out
of the approximately 4000 plaintiffs were selected to be fully prepared
for trial. The state MDLjudge then set trial dates and systematically
assigned cases to other judges for trial or tried them himself. Once
the marketplace of litigation determined values by settlement or ver-
dict, it was easier for counsel to negotiate individual, group, and
global settlements.
In the repetitive stress syndrome litigation, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation declined to transfer and consolidate the mul-
tiple federal cases. °'0 As a result, there was a marketplace of litigation
in federal and state courts that provided information for parties to
evaluate the litigation.
The Fen/Phen litigation is the most recent example of the de
facto implementation of an institutional cooperative strategy. The
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the federal
cases in the hands of a transferee judge. 3 The transferee judge then
appointed class action oriented plaintiffs' lawyers to lead the litigation
' SeeIn reDiet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL-1203, CIV-. 98-20594, 1999 WL
782560, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1999) (noting that state proceedings were occurring
simultaneously with the federal proceedings).
9See Norplan4 168 F.R.D. at 578 (denying a motion for class certification because
"individual trials are necessary in order to allow the court to make an informed deci-
sion regarding whether common issues predominate and whether certification of a
class is superior to other methods for handlingth[e] litigation").
'0' For a further discussion of this litigation, in which the author served as special
master, see McGovern, supra note 1, at 1839.
" See Repetitive Stress Injuy Prods. Liab. Litig, 1992 WL 403023, at *1 ("[W]e are not
persuaded... that the degree of common questions of fact among these actions rises
to the level that transfer under Section 1407 would best serve the overall convenience
of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of this entire
litigation.").
'2 See Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 1999WL 782560, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1999).
' See id at *2 (referring to the December 12, 1997, order from the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation transferring several federal Fen/Phen cases to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania).
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and imposed a fee on all cases to fund that group of counsel. Other
plaintiffs' lawyers, seeing that control of the MDL was in the hands of
the class action lawyers, chose to avoid federal court by filing in state
courts, notably in New Jersey, the home of the defendant.' °5 Thus,
there were only a small number of individual cases filed in federal
court and a larger number of individual cases and class actions filed in
state courts.
The composition of the plaintiffs' committee to lead the
Fen/Phen litigation differed from that of the lead counsel in the sili-
cone gel breast implant litigation. In the silicone gel class action, the
MDL judge mixed a variety of plaintiffs' counsel on the same commit-
tee, forcing them to make joint decisions.00 In the Fen/Phen litiga-
tion there was substantially less internal conflict among the MDL
plaintiffs' counsel; the boutique and other lawyers simply filed in state
court. Thus, there were two parallel activities occurring in the
Fen/Phen litigation: a class action approach in federal court and in-
dividual cases and class actions in state courts. The MDL court pur-
sued consolidated overall discovery with a view toward global settle-
ment, and the state courts hosted a cacophony of litigation.
The bulk of the state judges who had Fen/Phen cases deferred to
the federal judge by, in effect, complying with the federal case man-
agement plan. °7 There were a number of outliers, however, who did
not defer; they proceeded to manage their cases independently of the
MDL . Because of the inherently comprehensive nature of MDL dis-
covery, individual and even class action cases in state courts would
proceed much more quickly. As a result, cases were set for trial in
'04 See id. (stating that "[i]n order to facilitate the administration of MDL No. 1203,
the court has appointed a number of attorneys to serve on the Plaintiffs' Management
Committee").
10 See Judge Bechtle Conducts First Fen-Phen Status Conference; Says 'Streamline te Litiga-
tion, MEALE'S LTG. REP.: FtN-PHEN/REDUX, Jan. 1998, at 3, 3 (noting the suggestion
made by plaintiffs' lawyers that the committee be more balanced, comprised of lawyers
from different camps and areas of the country); see also Paul D. Rheingold et aL., State
Courts Provide New Forum for Mass Torts, NAT'L L.J., Feb, 22, 1999, at C28 (discussing the
anger of plaintiffs' counsel with the fees charged by steering committees).
1o4 See supra note 100 (referencing further discussion of the silicone gel litigation).
107 See Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 1999 WL 782560, at *2 (noting that between De-
cember 12, 1997, and September 27, 1999, the MDL court received over 1000 cases).
'0 See, e.g., Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. CIV.A. 97-2307, 1999 WL 317434 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. May 6, 1999) (denying a motion and summarizing a wrongful death action
arising out of Fen/Phen use brought in Massachusetts state court); American Home
Prods. Corp. v. Bernal, 5 S.W. 3d 344 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (granting rehearing on
joinder issue in Fen/Phen products liability action brought by twenty plaintiffs in the
Texas state court).
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state courts prior to the resolution of the MDL pretrial proceedings.'9
Virtually all the lawyers in both federal and state cases cooperated
extensively with each other in the discovery process in order to reduce
their transaction costs. Innovative processes, including the MDL-
standardized fact sheets and electronic library, provided models for
discovery and were utilized in the parallel state actions."0
Fundamentally, however, there were two independent tracks: (1)
the federal pretrial discovery joined by the state judges who deferred
to the MDL and (2) the state case-by-case and state class action pro-
ceedings pursued independently of the MDL proceedings. The fed-
eral court provided the forum for overseeing discovery and the non-
deferring state judges provided the forum for a marketplace of litiga-
tion.
As the litigation progressed, individual state cases settled and large
trial verdicts were returned in Texas and Mississippi."' There were
also several state class actions certified for medical monitoring, and a
major state class action medical monitoring trial commenced in New
Jersey.12 As the defendant's stock price lowered and the company be-
came vulnerable to a takeover, as the defendant decided to merge
with another company, 4 as the statute of limitations ran,"5 and as the
109 SeeJean Helwege, Fen-Phen Trial Dates Come Up, Spurring National Settlement Dis-
cussions, TRIAL, July 1999, at 114, 114 (discussing the first Fen/Phen trials, beginning
in April, 1999, in Texas state courts).
"o See Rheingold et al., supra note 105, at G28 (discussing the role of MDL proce-
dures in federal cases and the attractiveness of state claims in avoiding global settle-
ments).
... See Hellwege, supra note 109, at 114 (discussing previous settlements and nego-
tiating for future settlements); Fen-Phen Suit Jury Awards $23.4 Million to E. Texan: Drug
Company Vows To Appeal the Decision, DALLAS MORNING NEwS, Aug. 7, 1999, at IA (not-
ing that the verdict was based on negligence and stating that legal observers described
the case as "a weak Fen-phen case").
"' See Laura johannes & Robert Langreth, Fen-Phen Defense: Marketer of Redux, Mull-
ing Settlement, Sees Plaintifrs Hand, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1999, at Al (noting the New
Jersey suit and testimony regarding the high volume of "adverse events" being reported
to American Home Products).
"s See Fen-Phen Maker Misled Doctors About Damage, Lawyer Says, DALLAS MORNING
NEWs, Aug. 12, 1999, at 2D (referring to American Home's stock hitting a 52-week low
at the time of the NewJersey law suit).
"' See Robert Langreth et al, Anatomy of a DrugMerger How Two Leaders Courted and
Struck, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1999, at BI (reporting on the proposed merger between
Warner-Lambert and American Home Products).
n5 The statute of limitations began running in September 1998, when potential
problems attributable to Fen/Phen were first identified.
The fate of Pondimin and Redux was sealed in early September, when the
FDA received the results of echocardiograph studies conducted on patients
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NewJersey medical monitoring trial proceeded to conclusion,16 some
of the parties reached agreement on an overall settlement to be im-
plemented in the federal forum with state court participation.' 17 At
the end of the day, the cases in the state courts provided the informa-
tion and the pressure; the federal court proceedings provided the
comprehensive discovery, procedure, and jurisdiction for global reso-
lution.
The proposed settlement also accommodated the conflicts among
plaintiffs' counsel by providing two funds and a multiple opt-out. One
fund was created to make payments according to a grid for plaintiffs
who suffered specified harms,"8 and a second fund was created for
medical monitoring."9 The first fund was established by the federal
class action lawyers who would be compensated accordingly.2 The
second fund was for the state class action lawyers who would be com-
pensated accordingly.12 1 Plaintiffs who decided to proceed on their
own could do so by opting out.'2 The opt-out provisions were for law-
yers who desired to proceed independently and be compensated
through their clients' compensation. The defendant has an opportu-
who had used the drugs. Although the number of subjects was small-just
284 divided among five studies-the results were disturbing: Nearly one in
three had evidence of heart valve disease.
Bob Van Voris, Fen-Phen Suits Grow: Panel Mulls MDL Forum for Diet-Drug Litigation as
Feds Urge Heart Exams, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 1, 1997, at Al. The statute of limitations for tort
actions in most states runs for two years from the date of discovery of the injury or the
connection between the injury and the cause. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-
102 (West 1999); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2805.10 (West 1999); TEX. Crv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (West 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243 (Michie 1999).
'" See Robert Langreth, American Home Is Ordered To Pay $23.36 Million in Diet-Drug
Suit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1999, at A4 (mentioning the impending opening arguments
in a NewJersey class action case involving Pondimin and Redux).
17 See Charles Omstein, Fen-Phen Suits Will Be Settled: American Home Products To Pay
up to $3.75 Billion, DALLAS MORNING NEwS, Oct. 8, 1999, at ID (reporting on American
Home's announcement that it will settle lawsuits with most of the former users of
Fen/Phen and for any who develop injuries from the drugs in the coming years).
"8 See Ellen Mazo, The Wonder Drug That Wasn't After Reports of Heart-Valve Damage,
Users of the Fen-Phen Diet Drug ConsiderLegalAction, Prrr. POST-GAZETrE, Nov. 2,1999, at
F1 (noting establishment of a settlement fund for persons injured by Fen/Phen).
" See id. (stating that $1.2 billion was set aside for medical monitoring of former
Fen/Phen users).
"2 See Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement with American Home Prod-
ucts Corporation 17 (Nov. 19, 1999).
"2 See id. at 19.
2 See Robert Langreth & Gardiner Harris, Verdict Pushes AHP To Settle Fen-Phen
Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1999, at AS (noting fen-phen users across the country were
considering whether to opt out of the national settlement plan reached between
American Home Products and plaintiffs' lawyers).
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nity to reject the settlement if it is not satisfied with the number of
opt-outs and opposition is expected from a variety of sources who
deem their interests affected.'2 Court approval of this proposed set-
tlement is pending.
Notwithstanding its overall value, the de facto cooperative strategy
of a marketplace of litigation in state courts and consolidated discov-
ery and settlement in federal court has multiple weaknesses. There is
still redundant discovery. There are still conflicting rulings on discov-
ery, evidence, and substantive law. There are still dueling class actions
and other contrary proceedings. There are inequalities in the timing
and outcomes of similarly situated individual cases.
More important is the problem of selection bias in the state fo-
rums that are providing the information upon which an eventual set-
tlement can be based. It is an unrepresentative subset of state courts
that are generating trials, settlements, and verdicts. This subset is
typically, by virtue of both MDL plaintiff and defendant efforts, more
plaintiff-oriented. Defendants usually feel more comfortable in the
single, federal forum. Conversely, plaintiffs counsel independently
seek a favorite forum, which may be the federal court or any one of
the state courts. The defense strategy of attempting to have all state
courts defer to the federal court cannot succeed if there are any sig-
nificant exceptions, as was the case in the silicone gel breast implant
litigation.'2 While the defense-oriented jurisdictions defer, the plain-
tiff-orientedjurisdictions proceed to provide data points, with a result-
ing asymmetry of information.
Another important problem with the de facto cooperative strategy
is that the "ultimate global resolution" is typically not an ultimate
global resolution. Multiple opt-out rights allow some containment
and increased predictability, but not final resolution. This problem of
lack of finality is quite significant for defendants. As long as a tail of
potential liability overhangs a defendant's financial condition, many
investors will discount the value of the company or otherwise increase
its cost of capital. Given the high level of risk aversion to the mass tort
litigation tail by major segments of the capital markets, the lack of fi-
nality can have a major impact on the financial strength, and even vi-
123 See, e.g., id. (noting the decline of defendant's stock price in response to the
suit).
124 See i. (stating that a judge will decide whether to approve the settlement this
spring).
'2 See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (describing the extent to which
state courts deferred to federal courts during the silicone gel breast implant litigation).
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tality, of a company.
VII. TOWARD A MORE FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION
OF A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY
Given the problems with de facto implementation, is there a way
to systematize the cooperative strategy more permanently? There are
four basic proposals, in both stronger or weaker versions, that have
some potential: (1) revise the MDL rule or approach to make the
strategy explicit; (2) revise Rule 23 to allow for more comprehensive
settlements; (3) provide institutional support for state judges and for
cooperative efforts; and (4) revise the Manual for Complex Litigation to
educate judges concerning cooperative institutional strategy.
The strongest version would involve new legislation. If the MDL
statute were amended to allow the transferee judge to oversee pretrial
discovery for both federal and state cases, it would be possible to re-
duce much of the redundant discovery. In addition, if the MDL stat-
ute were revised to override Lexecon, the MDLjudge could try individ-
ual cases from a broad geographical distribution, thereby providing
more systematic data points for evaluating the mass tort. Further-
more, if the MDL judge would remand a limited number of cases to
federal and state courts for trial with a sound methodology of case se-
lection, creating a more representative marketplace of litigation, then
the current biases could be reduced. If the MDL judge would explic-
itly defer aggregation for settlement until after the litigation market-
place had spoken and toll the statute of limitations or otherwise
eliminate incentives for the premature filing of cases, then the prema-
ture massness that preempts a liability determination could be less-
ened.
The chance of this entire package of case management techniques
occurring, absent legislative and behavioral changes, is limited. The
reasons for this skepticism include not only the fact that Congress has
been opposed to rule changes of this kind, but also the inherent dis-
trust that plaintiffs' counsel, particularly the boutique lawyers, would
have of an MDL judge actually deferring to state judges for any pur-
pose, much less for multiple trials.
A weaker, but more practical, version of this proposal would not
require a new statute. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
could have substantial influence in creating an environment condu-
cive to implementation of a cooperative institutional strategy. The
panel's initial decision to consolidate cases as well as its opinion in
that regard are critical guideposts. In addition, the panel's programs
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for transferee judges provide an excellent opportunity to educate
both federal and, occasionally, state judges concerning the various
strategies for managing a mass tort.
If the MDL panel expanded its current practice of not transfer-
ring cases until the marketplace of litigation had spoken, ; la the re-
petitive stress cases, the dangers of premature aggregation could be
reduced . 6 A broader sample of trial and settlement results would not
eliminate outlier verdicts but would dilute their importance. This di-
lution would be critical to the generation of more accurate data points
to inform any ultimate resolution of a mass tort litigation.
If the MDL panel made it explicit that the transferee judge is not
to engage in aggregation other than discovery until the mass tort ma-
tured in the marketplace of state court litigation, there would still be
some duplicative discovery. Hopefully, it would be only for a limited
period of time and in limited circumstances. Furthermore, as experi-
ence has shown us, counsel tend to cooperate with each other in this
regard anyway. If the MDL panel desired, it could bifurcate the dis-
covery and settlement aspects of the transferee judge's role by with-
holding the settlement role from the transferee judge until after there
was sufficient information from the litigation to inform further pro-
ceedings.
Under either scenario, the MDL judge would be able to sponsor
settlement discussions and use the available federal procedural rules
to bring the litigation to a conclusion. In the event that settlement
was not successful, the MDL judge could exercise docket control in
remanding cases in a systematic manner without opening the flood-
gates of litigation inequitably.
A second option is to revise Rule 23 to accommodate mass tort set-
tlements. There have been multiple proposals that are quite elegant
and effective,12 but the current political realities are not auspicious.'
28
Settling defendants will probably be forced to accept containment
'2 See supra note 101 and accompanying text (describing the MDL panel's refusal
to transfer and consolidate the repetitive stress syndrome cases).
12 See generally Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class
Action Amendments, 89 ARuz. L. REv. 615 passim (1997) (analyzing the constitutionality
of proposed changes to Rule 23); H. Thomas Wells, Jr., Fine-Tuning Class Action Rules,
BUSINESS LAW TODAY, May/June 1998, at 39, 40-41 (describing proposals to revise Rule
23).
'2 See Wells, supra note 127, at 41 ("As a result of the controversy surrounding its
rather modest proposals, the advisory committee concluded that there were deep
philosophical divisions on many of the issues. Thus, it ultimately only sought Standing
Committee approval of two changes to Rule 23....").
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rather than peace. This was the approach taken in the revised settle-
ment plan in the silicone gel breast implant litigation,' the HIV
blood serum cases,'3 ' and apparently in the Fen/Phen cases.' 3' The
concept is to turn an elastic mass tort into an inelastic mass tort, quan-
tify the contained universe of remaining claims, set aside sufficient
litigation and settlement resources, and move ahead. Unfortunately
for defendants, the capital markets have been particularly risk averse if
there is any contingent liability for a mass tort., 2 Perhaps over time
financial decision-makers can be convinced that the cost of obtaining
global peace in mass tort litigation far exceeds the risks associated
with this containment approach. The peace premium for corporate
predictability may simply be unavailable at any price.
Thirdly, there is a need for institutional support for the state judi-
ciary and a vehicle for cooperative efforts. The "charisma" typical of
the bottom-up cooperative efforts of the last several decades needs to
be "routinized" in order to sustain more permanency.'-" Given the
number of available state judges to participate in a marketplace of liti-
gation, there is not ajudicial resource problem in toto, but there is a
resource problem for each individual judge. If the State Justice Insti-
tute could fund the National Center for State Courts, for example, to
establish an institutional mechanism similar to the now defunct Mass
Tort Litigation Committee to share information and provide limited
support, there could be a permanent method of insuring a more ef-
fective state marketplace of litigation. The role of such an institution
would be that of a halfway house between bottom-up and top-down
"2 See supra text accompanying note 100 (noting consolidation in the silicone gel
breast implant cases).
'-o See In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 159 F.3d 1016, 1020
(7th Cir. 1998) (denying any further challenges to the settlement plans that provided
for a $40 million fund for attorneys' fees and $100,000 for each class member who
agreed to release defendants from liability).
131 See supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text (discussing consolidation in the
Fen/Phen cases).
132 For example, the markets reacted strongly to the Texas Fen/Phen verdict. See
Langreth, supra note 114, at B1 (noting that American Home Products' market capi-
talization lost 20% of its value after the verdict); see also Langreth & Harris, supra note
122, at AS ("American Home was under pressure to settle the... suits because it is in
the midst of trying to merge with Warner-Lambert Co ..... ).
"' See Max Weber, 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 251 (Gunther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., 1968) ("For charisma to be transformed into an everyday phenomenon, it is nec-
essary that its anti-economic character should be altered. It must be adapted to some
form of fiscal organization to provide for the needs of the group .... ").
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reform.TM It would be particularly critical to implement the weaker
version of the proposed MDL changes. State judges are currently not
positioned on parity with MDL judges.135 Their role could be
strengthened if they could act collectively. At the same time, probably
the most powerful impetus for independentjudges to act in a cohesive
fashion is peer pressure. By bringing critical actors together there
would be increased chances of coherent process. In a weaker version,
the MDL transferee judge could unilaterally provide the funding for
state judges on an ad hoc basis for each new mass tort.
Finally, the Manual for Complex Litigation could provide a road map
for this cooperative strategy. The various versions of the Manual have
reflected a healthy tension between flexibility and predictability in
case managementI36 Current practice suggests that each mass tort is
different and thus the management of tort cases should be different.
There is, however, an increasing demand, particularly by defendants,
for predictability in the form of more concrete rules of case manage-
ment and for more a rule-based role forjudges.'s' Defendants suggest
that the universe of plaintiffs' counsel should know in advance that a
mass tort defendant will have a realistic opportunity to challenge sci-
entific and other facts before such a large number of claims are
amassed in a way that precludes any attempt by a defendant to "win"
an alleged mass tort. If the Board of Editors are so inclined, a defini-
"4 One model of this more permanent institutionalization could involve a staff of
several employees who would be responsible for (1) identifying potential mass torts;
(2) notifying state supreme courts or their administrative offices of the nature of the
alleged tort; (3) organizing one or more conferences for judges designated by each
state supreme court; (4) funding the participants' travel expenses; (5) inviting appli-
cable federal judges; (6) involving applicable federal entities such as the Federal Judi-
cial Center, (7) designing a conference program so that the judges could familiarize
each other concerning their activities related to the alleged tort; (8) establishing a de-
pository of material of mutual benefit to the judges; (9) establishing a web page or
other means of communication to update the judges concerning important develop-
ments; and (10) assisting judges in any other appropriate cooperative efforts. The
fundamental goal of this type of institution would be to provide a vehicle or forum for
the judges to decide among themselves if and how they would like to cooperate.
.. See Schwarzer et al., suPra note 3, at 1714 ("[Flederal courts often have institu-
tional advantages, greater resources, and more flexible tools for aggregating their own
cases....").
" Cf MANUAL FOR COMPLEX IrTIGATION IST, supra note 40, with MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION 2D, supra note 46. The first edition, for example, provides for
standardized waves of discovery in a specified order, whereas the second edition leaves
the ordering of discovery to each individual judge.
137 See Letter from David M. Bernick to Francis McGovern, Professor at Duke Uni-
versity School of Law (Apr. 14, 2000) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Revi).
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tive cooperative strategy could be included in a future Manua, in ei-
ther the strong or weak form.
CONCLUSION
Whether judges intend or not, they are pursuing a case manage-
ment strategy in mass tort litigation. Cooperation among judges in
the sense of communication and coordination has worthwhile, but
limited, benefits. Cooperation among judges in the sense of deferral
of the state judiciary to a federal MDLjudge is more problematic. Not
only are there adverse implications for federalism, due process, and
our adversarial litigation system, but it is inevitable that at least some
state judges, typically in unrepresentative venues, will not defer, result-
ing in verdicts or settlements that will constitute skewed data points
for informing a global resolution to the litigation. A strategy of coop-
eration at the institutional level-taking advantage of the state courts
to create a marketplace of litigation and the federal courts to coordi-
nate discovery and promote a national settlement-can create other-
wise unobtainable joint gains. Under existing laws, there is no silver
bullet to end horizontal inequity or litigation inefficiency, but these
weaknesses can be diluted by pursuing a cooperative institutional
strategy that will reduce error costs associated with unpredictable pro-
cedures, inaccurate information, agency failure, and federalism con-
flicts.
